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1. Survey of earnings quality 
 Although the concept of earnings quality has been discussed widely, there is 
still no agreement about its definition and measurement (Revsine et al., 2001, 
Penman and Zhang, 2002), making it an elusive concept (Siegel, 1982). In Siegel 
(1991) five elements, such as the degree to which the economic reality of the firm is 
reflected, are mentioned as characteristics that raise the quality of profits, and eleven 
other items, including estimated discretion, are mentioned as characteristics which 
lower quality. Francis et al. (2004) argue that there are seven attributes of earnings, 
such as accruals quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, 
timeliness, and conservatism, and examine their relationship with the cost of equity 
capital. Kothari (2001) mentions corporate evaluation by investors, and discretional 
management as relevant factors, and categorises arguments on earnings quality. 
Schipper and Vincent (2003) present the value relevance viewpoint, and an 
economics-based concept of income, examining attributes which specify earnings 
quality, such as time series properties of earnings, including persistence, predictive 
ability and variability, the qualitative characteristics of a conceptual framework, the 
relationships between income, cash, and accruals, and the implementation of 
decisions. 
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As the literature does not agree on either the definition or the measurement of 
earnings quality, providing a classification can become a subject in itself. In addition, 
characteristics such as persistence, predictive ability, smoothness, and conservatism, 
are not necessarily separable theoretically. How are the common elements contained 
in earnings quality theorised by various researchers? This poses a problem in itself 
and each attribute is connected with what is called earnings management. Moreover, 
what is not related to value relevance is contained within the framework of earnings 
management. Although various views could exist with regard to the classification 
method itself in such a situation, this paper uses the classification of Shipper and 
Vincent (2003) described previously as a base1.  
 
 
1-1. Time series properties of earnings 
(1) Persistence 
Earnings quality is often discussed from the perspective of value relevance or 
its usefulness for decision-making, and measurement is examined in connection with  
capital markets. For example, Scott (2003) suggests that earnings quality and ERC 
(earnings response coefficients) have a positive correlation, and defines earnings 
quality by the predictive ability of the price return. If earnings quality is theorised in 
this way, the concept of persistence would be the factor first mentioned2. 
According to Lipe (1990), persistence of earnings is defined as the 
autocorrelation of earnings3. Revsine et al. (2001), Bernstein and Wild (2000), and 
Penman and Zhang (2002) consider persistence to be one of the characteristics 
which constitute earnings quality from the perspective of value relevance. It has 
been often argued that persistence of earnings and ERC have a positive correlation, 
after Kormendi and Lipe (1987). In Lipe (1990), it is verified that earnings with a 
higher predictive ability of future earnings have a higher ERC. Penman (2003) also 
mentions that it is high quality earnings that will become a better index of future 
earnings. Several studies discuss persistence of earnings in relation to the 
fundamentals. In Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), it is considered that persistence is an 
index which measures the grade in which earnings reflect fundamentals. 
                                                 
1 This paper does not consider the relations with audit or corporate governance. Warfield et al. (1995) 
examine the influence of governance structures on the disclosure incentive and accruals. Lee et al. 
(2007) reports that a high-level governance structure reduces earnings management. 
2 Although predictive ability is also mentioned as one of the time series properties in Shipper and 
Vincent (2003), since it is related to persistence and accruals, it is not described independently in this 
paper, but included within these characteristics. 
3 Sustainability and persistence are considered to be interchangeable. (Schipper and Vincent, 2003). 
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 However, there are several unresolved problems regarding the relationship 
between persistence and value relevance. Sloan (1996) mentions that information on 
the relationship between future earnings and each constituent factor of reported 
earnings, accruals and cash flow, is not rationally reflected in a capital market. Sloan 
highlights an ‘accruals anomaly’ – that is, that accruals have a higher correlation 
with stock returns even though persistence of accruals is lower than operating cash 
flow. The same result is reported in quarterly data by Collins and Hrivar (2000). Lev 
and Nissim (2006) also report that the accruals anomaly still exists. Regarding these 
results, Xie (2001) argues that the persistence of operating cash flow is higher when 
compared with normal accruals or abnormal accruals; however, abnormal accruals 
which has the lowest persistence, is overestimated in capital market. Xie also 
showed that the accruals anomaly originates in abnormal accruals. Moreover, Ali et 
al. (2000) suggest that the accruals anomaly does not originate with the existence of 
naive investors,  
Persistence of earnings might be theorised in relation to the reliability of 
accruals. Richardson et al. (2005) classify accruals comprehensively (not only 
operating accruals) and report that lower reliable accruals bring about lower 
persistence of earnings. In Drake et al. (2007) which verifies the relation between 
persistence and information disclosure, it is shown that persistence of cash flow and 
accruals are reflected in stock return in situations where the information disclosure is 
of high quality. 
 
 
(2) Variability 
① Smoothness 
According to Schipper and Vincent (2003) and Subramanyam(1996), since 
smoothed earnings are persistent and their predictive ability is high, it might be said 
that smoothness raises the quality of earnings. However, there is also a view that 
managers have smoothed earnings because managers believe that lower variable 
earnings are preferred by investors (Levitt, 1998). Leuz et al. (2003) examine 
systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries, and propose an 
explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders use earnings 
management to conceal the actual performance of firms from outsiders. Leuz et al. 
argue that the explanatory capability of smoothed earnings is inferior compared to 
that of stock return, and mention that the reason for this is the noise added by 
managerial discretion. Bao and Bao (2004) argue that lower variability of earnings 
does not guarantee that income smoothers will have higher firm values. They point 
out that quality earnings smoothers have the highest price-earnings multiple while 
non-quality non-smoothers have the lowest price-earnings multiple. 
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② Conservativeness 
Conservativeness is often discussed as one of the characteristics of specifying 
earnings quality. However, it is not necessarily agreed whether or not it is a factor 
which raises the quality of profits. In Hawkins and Campbell (1978) and Bernstein 
et al. (1998), more conservative earnings are seen as higher quality. On the other 
hand, Schipper (1989) indicates that early recognition of fair value change of 
financial assets, impairment loss, etc. bring measurement errors into financial 
reporting, not only because of errors in managerial predictions and judgments but 
also because they can potentially be caused by simplified assumptions in incomplete 
contracts. 
Similarly, Penman and Zhang (2002) mention that since the predictive ability 
of current earnings for future earnings is lower when the connection between 
conservativeness and investment action makes earnings more variable in the short 
term, the quality (persistence) of earnings is lower. Beaver and Engel (1996) 
examine the capital market pricing of discretionary and nondiscretionary 
components of the allowance for loan losses. They verify that the capital market 
perceives the allowance to be comprised of two components, a nondiscretionary 
component which is negatively priced and a discretionary component whose 
incremental pricing coefficient is positive. Sen (2005) proposes that managers of a 
growing firm could choose to report conservative but lower quality (in terms of 
predictability of future cash flow) earnings or to undo the effects of conservatism by 
a less conservative current-period cost estimate to improve the quality of reported 
earnings. Sen (2005) points out that an incentive for higher quality earnings might 
be associated with an incentive to reduce investments in some firms. In addition, 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006), Basu (1997) and Schipper and Vincent (2003) 
mention that the timeliness of loss recognition is the key characteristic for specifying 
earnings quality, and may reduce it4.  
 
 
1-2. Earnings, Cash flow, and Accruals 
Other arguments which are not covered in the preceding sections are discussed 
below. There are quite a few arguments that accruals and its constituent factors 
might be the characteristics that reduce earnings quality (Schipper and Vincent, 
2003). With regard to managerial discretion, its relationship with earnings quality is 
mentioned by Bernstein and Siegel (1979). In Teets (2002), earnings quality and 
earnings management are mutually related concepts. Healy and Wahlen (1999) state 
that earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead 
                                                 
4 Regarding the relation between early revenue recognition and earnings quality, see Altamuro (2005). 
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some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on the reported accounting numbers. 
They also mention that many different incentives for earnings management need to 
be examined, including capital market expectations and valuation, contracts written 
in terms of accounting numbers, and antitrust or other government regulation. 
Capital market studies are easily connected with frameworks that look at 
earnings quality from the perspective of value relevance. In particular, abnormal 
accruals where the predictions and judgments of a manager are included lower the 
quality of earnings in many cases. Jones (1991) and extended by Dechow et 
al.(1995) posit accounting fundamentals that drive normal or nondiscretionary 
accruals and presume that the residuals or prediction errors from a regression of total 
accruals on accounting fundamentals capture earnings management. The residuals or 
prediction errors are viewed as an inverse measure of earnings quality (Schipper and 
Vincent, 2003). However, this model has attracted much criticism (Bernard and 
Skinner, 1996, Young, 1999)5.  
In Dechow and Dichev (2002), the identification problem of accounting 
fundamentals that is not manipulated could be avoided by a model which estimates 
the measurement errors of total accruals directly from cash flow. They point out that 
the estimated residuals are viewed as inverse measures of accruals and earnings 
quality, and the accruals quality and the persistence of earnings are in positive 
correlation. Scholer (2004) verifies the relationship between accruals and cash flow, 
as well as the relationship between accruals and earnings quality. In Francis et al. 
(2005), it is pointed out that lower quality of accruals, measured by residuals, relates 
to the increase in cost of capital and debt. The consistent result is reported in Chan et 
al. (2006). 
With regard to the predictive ability of future cash flow and earnings quality, 
Dechow et al. (1998) investigate the role of accruals in predicting future cash flow. 
They report that earnings better predict future cash flow than current operating cash 
flow. This study is extended by Barth et al. (2001), who show that cash flow and the 
accrual components of current earnings have substantially more predictive ability for 
future cash flow than aggregate earnings. This result implies that each accruals 
component reflects different information relating to future cash flow. Nikkinen and 
Sahlström (2004) investigates the impact of an accounting environment on the 
performance of the cash flow prediction models by Barth et al. (2001). The result 
suggests that the model could be used in different kinds of accounting environments, 
such as market-oriented countries with high quality of accruals, and with low quality 
ones. 
                                                 
5 DeAngelo (1986) presents an approach which measures earnings quality through the change in total 
accruals. 
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Regarding predictive ability, the difficulty of future prediction by analysts 
might be inserted into the index of earnings quality. In Imhoff and Gerald (1992), 
the effect of uncertainty in analysts’ earnings forecasts on the relation between 
unexpected returns and unexpected earnings is examined. The results indicate the 
systematic relation between ex ante uncertainty for which the variance in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts prior to the firm’s annual earnings announcement is employed as 
a proxy, and the information content of earnings. Crabtree and Maher (2005) 
examine the relation between earnings predictability, which is measured by the 
difference between the actual earnings and analysts’ forecast, and the cost of debt 
capital measured by its influence on bond rating. The results indicate that the degree 
of predictability of earnings is positively associated with a firm’s bond rating, and is 
negatively associated with the offering yield. However, managerial behaviour to 
meet analysts’ forecasts might decrease the earnings quality (Schipper and Vincent, 
2003). 
The view that the quality of earnings, approximated to cash flow, is high 
(Palepu et al., 2000) is often discussed as well. It might be supposed that cash flow 
is objective and non-discretionary, as exemplified by the comment  ‘Cash is King’ 
(Copeland et al., 1990). Ou and Penman(1989) mention that financial statement 
analysis is useful in determining investment position, and Penman(2001) describes 
that the purpose of accounting quality analysis is to distinguish the hard amount 
resulting from cash flow, from the soft amount resulting from accruals accounting. 
However, cash flow is not necessarily clear on how ‘hard’ the amount is. Research 
which divides earnings into cash flow and accruals in order to investigate the 
relationship with earnings quality would encounter the problem of how each of these 
are defined and measured (Schipper and Vincent, 2003). 
In the context of the value relevance related to a capital market, it is often 
supposed that earnings management and earnings quality are in negative correlation. 
However, discretional alternative gives managers, who have more information about 
a company than any other person concerned, the means to disclose information, so 
that earnings quality might be raised by it (Schipper,1989; Palepu et al.,2000). 
Subramanyam, (1996) points out that managerial discretion is the side that raises the 
predictive ability of earnings. Similarly, Arya et al. (2003) verify that both the size 
and the time series of earnings are informative when managers who have incentives 
to disclose the rational information use discretions for the measurement of persistent 
earnings6. 
                                                 
6 With regard to earnings management based on incentives related to contract and earnings quality, 
the early research of Healy (1985) highlights the relation between accruals and payment on the 
contract, and demonstrates earnings management. For recent studies, see also Brown (2001), Barua et 
al. (2006), Christensen et al. (2005). 
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2. The concept of ‘Released from Risks’ in ASBJ 
  The Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) is an independent, private 
sector body whose aim is to develop accounting standards in Japan.  The ASBJ itself 
is a core committee within the Financial Accounting Standards Foundation (FASF), 
which was established in July 2001 to contribute to the development of financial 
practices, capital markets, and the development and improvement of the 
international accounting system, by studying, researching, and developing generally 
accepted accounting standards, and by studying and researching disclosure systems 
and various other practices pertinent to business finance systems7.  
FASF is composed of four organizations, namely the Board of Directors 
which is responsible for the overall operation of FASF, Trustees which monitor 
business operations and play an advisory role, the Theme Advisory Council which 
makes recommendations on themes to be deliberated and prioritizes them, and the 
ASBJ which is a core organization within FASF, directly responsible for the 
development and deliberation of accounting standards. As a core organization of 
FASF, ASBJ has several tasks; a) to investigate and develop the generally accepted 
accounting standards in Japan, b) to investigate practices concerning corporate 
finance and disclosure in order to make pertinent recommendations, and c) to 
contribute to the development of high-quality, internationally accepted accounting 
standards.  ASBJ is made up of several special committees such as the financial 
instruments technical committee, some of which have working groups, and some 
projects such as the ASBJ/IASB convergence project. This paper discusses the 
conceptual framework for the financial reporting system jointly developed by a 
technical committee consisting of the ASBJ and other committees and projects.  
In 2003, a working group on fundamental concepts was organized to develop 
an essential supporting structure – a  conceptual framework for the financial 
reporting system. The ASBJ Discussion Paper, Conceptual Framework of Financial 
Accounting, was released in 2004 (ASBJ, 2004). In 2006, the technical committee 
on fundamental concepts organised after the publication of ASBJ (2004) released a 
revised version, ASBJ (2006). The paper covers the objective of financial reporting, 
the qualitative characteristics of accounting information, the elements of financial 
statements, and recognition and measurement in financial statements. It begins from 
the objective of financial reporting, and defines net assets and comprehensive 
income directly from the definitions of assets and liabilities. Its approach and 
contents seem to be similar to the conceptual frameworks of IASB and FASB. 
However, ASBJ (2006) attaches importance to a layered structure, which begins 
                                                 
7 http://www.asb.or.jp 
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from the objective of financial reporting, and to the concept of net income, thus 
differing from the conceptual frameworks of IASB and FASB. 
In ASBJ (2006) the objective of financial reporting is to measure and disclose 
the position of the entity’s investments and the results of those investments as part of 
the disclosure system that assists investors in making decisions, so that it is the 
disclosure of the financial situation of the entity that assists investors in predicting 
the performance of the entity and in estimating its value8. Investors decide what 
funds to invest in entities at their own will, with the expectation of obtaining 
uncertain future cash flow9. Those who predict the performance of the entity and 
estimate its value are investors and the decisions they make are own. 
However, there is a disparity between investors and managers regarding the 
opportunity to obtain pertinent information in many cases. It is necessary to promote 
the disclosure of private information held by managers in order to relieve asymmetry 
of information and to resolve the malfunction of a capital market caused by such 
asymmetry, which is the raison d’etre of the disclosure system. Managers are 
basically required to disclose information on the results of the investments actually 
achieved by those investments10. Among the information that financial reporting 
provides, profit (or income) information is commonly used in predicting future cash 
flow, even though it is basically the results achieved in the past11. Such information 
represents the results of the entity’s investments, and provides the basis for 
estimating the value of the entity for investors. In particular, net income information 
has been widely used by investors for some time and its usefulness has been 
supported by empirical evidences. Therefore, net income should continue to be 
positioned as an independent and separate element of financial statements12. 
Net income is defined as a portion of the changes in net assets during a certain 
period (excluding changes resulting from direct transactions with shareholders, etc.) 
that represents the results of investments that are released from business risks during 
a certain period and are attributable to the owners of the reporting entity13. On the 
other hand, comprehensive income is defined as the changes in net assets during a 
certain period resulting from transactions or events other than direct transactions 
with shareholders, etc.14 Net income differs from comprehensive income in respect 
of the timing and the range of entities. The term ‘released from risks of investments’ 
                                                 
8 ASBJ (2006), Chap.1, Introduction, para.2 
9 Ibid., Chap.1, para.2 
10 Ibid., Chap.1, paras.1,2 
11 Ibid., Chap.1, para.3 
12 Ibid., Chap.3, para.21 
13 Ibid., Chap.3, para.9 
14 Ibid., Chap.3, para.8 
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is used in defining net income in ASBJ (2006). Since the expectation of investment 
results are characterised by uncertainty, the results are released from risks when they 
become facts15.  The results of the investments that are released from business risks 
are generally determined based on whether or not the facts (which can be compared 
with expectations regarding the investment made by the entity) have occurred. The 
concept of ‘released from risks’ is a perspective in which greater importance is 
attached not to the appearance of assets but to the aims of investments and the 
intentions of managers. The need for a concept of ‘release from a risk’ lies in the 
very objective of financial reporting. As mentioned previously, the objective is to 
disclose useful information to assist investors in making decisions. What investors 
need is information on actual earned results as opposed to expected results16. 
What are the expected result and the facts in each investment? For business 
investments, whether the results of investments have been released from risks is 
generally determined based on whether assets that are not subject to business risks 
have been obtained in exchange for assets that are subject to business risks17. When 
present investment activity continues as it is, the assets are measured at historical 
cost (original acquisition cost) or depreciated cost. In this case, changes in the 
quoted market prices of the assets are not recognized as income. On the other hand, 
financial investments (trading securities are typical examples) are not restricted by 
business activities and held for favourable results from liquidation. Therefore, 
changes in the market prices of these investments are considered to be the results of 
the investments, and the amount of income is measured by increases in market 
prices during the period 18 . Although investments are classified into business 
investments and financial investments by their objective, business assets and 
financial assets classified by appearances are not necessarily in agreement. For 
example, fixed assets, such as a factory, are business investments, and their 
appearance is also business assets. However, regarding available-for-sale securities 
and investments in subsidiaries, such appearances are financial assets, but their 
objectives are business investments to the last, as they are restricted by business 
activities. 
Differences in the objectives of investments affect income measurement 
because the concept of released from risks is influenced by them. In the case where 
the objective of the investment is for business, it is measured by historical cost or 
depreciated cost and changes in market price are not recognised as income. On the 
other hand, in the case where the objective of the investment is for finance, changes 
                                                 
15 Ibid., Chap.3, para.23 
16 Ibid., Chap.3, para.23 
17 Ibid., Chap.4, paras.44, 57 
18 Ibid., Chap.4, paras,45, 57 
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in market price are considered as income. Income measurement relates to the 
difference in the objective, not to the appearance of assets.  
Since the concept of released from risks specifies the income concept, its 
relation with the concepts of realization or the realizable may be discussed. 
Conventionally, realization is used to refer to sales of cash or claims to cash, and it 
means the process of converting non-cash resources and rights into cash19. On the 
other hand, regarding what is realizable, revenues and gains are realizable when 
related assets received or held are readily convertible to known amounts of cash or 
claims to cash. Readily convertible assets contain interchangeable units and quoted 
prices are available in an active market20. The realizable concept is often applied to 
trading securities and the application of this concept refers to income measurement 
in market prices. 
How are the concepts of realization and the realizable connected with the 
concept of release from risks in ASBJ (2006)? Since that which fulfils the criteria of 
realization goes through a point-of-sale, it also must be released from risk. However, 
that which fulfils the concept of the realizable is not necessarily released from risks. 
For example, regarding trading securities, the mark-to-market difference is 
realizable and also released from risks. On the other hand, regarding available-for-
sale securities and investments in subsidiaries, their mark-to-market differences are 
realizable but not released from risks. Since these investments are still constrained 
by business activities and assets that are not subject to business risks have not been 
obtained, they are not released from risks.  
Therefore, realized results are considered to be results released from the risks 
of investments, while realizable results are not always results released from risks21. 
The difference between the concept of released from risks and the realized-
realizable concept has an important implication for income measurement. That is, 
the concept of released from risks offers a standard to distinguish whether it is an 
element contained in net income, while the realized-realizable concept does not offer 
such a standard.  
As discussed above, although the mark-to-market difference of trading 
securities and available-for-sale securities are both realizable, the difference of 
trading securities is an element contained in earnings, while the difference of 
available-for-sale securities is not contained in earnings. What is not contained in 
earnings, even if it fulfils a realizable concept, still exists. This means that the 
realized-realizable concept cannot offer a standard to distinguish an element 
contained in earnings. In contrast, what is released from risks must be included in 
                                                 
19 SFAC, No.6, para.143 
20 SFAC, No.5, para.83a 
21 ASBJ (2006), Chap.4, para.58 
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net income. Therefore, the concept of released from risks makes it possible to offer a 
standard to distinguish whether it is an element contained in net income. This is the 
important difference between the concept of released from the risks and the 
conventional concept of the realized-realizable. 
 
 
3. Allocation error in income measurement 
This section discusses the earnings quality specified by the concept of released 
from risks, which is one of the core concepts in ASBJ (2006). In this context, 
decision usefulness becomes the fundamental characteristic and is supported by 
relevance and reliability, as the qualitative characteristics of accounting 
information 22 . These qualitative characteristics are required for accounting 
information to achieve the objective of financial reporting. Income, as specified by 
the concept of released from risks, is assumed to fulfil these characteristics. 
However, arguing that these qualitative characteristics are fulfilled is not sufficient 
to theorise the concrete characteristics that constitute earnings quality. Thus, 
attention is paid to the theory of accruals, one of the characteristics of specifying 
earnings quality, and the allocation problem related to managerial discretion 
(earnings management). 
Regarding the allocation problem, as Thomas (1969, 1974) pointed out, a 
fundamental problem arises in that an optimal method cannot be uniquely decided 
upon within the period in which allocation and joint cost allocation occurs. As 
mentioned in surveys of earnings quality, there is also a view that the ambiguity of 
allocation, including the judgment of managers, reduces earnings quality. However, 
empirical studies support the finding that the value relevance of accruals is higher 
than cash flow. Since the content of the private information held by managers could 
be reflected in accruals, there is also an argument to be made that the usefulness of 
earnings is increased by accruals.    
Supposing, as ASBJ (2006) assume, that earnings are useful for investors 
because certain information in the future are reflected, the key might exist in the 
accounting accruals which are composed elements of earnings. In order to verify this 
argument, it is necessary to clarify the relationship between the structure of income 
measurement and manipulation in allocation. While the issue of depreciation is often 
central to analyses of the allocation problem, this paper focuses on subjective 
goodwill because the relationship between the allocation problem and earnings 
quality can be discussed more comprehensively. The conversion of  subjective 
goodwill so that it is recognised as earnings in each period when it converts into 
                                                 
22 Ibid., Chap.2, paras.1-8 
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cash flow,  relates to the measurement of income specified by the concept of 
released from risks. 
Subjective goodwill is assumed to be the difference of the value in use and the 
market price. Value in use is a present value of the future cash flow expected from 
the best use of the asset, discounted by the discount rate as of the measurement date, 
while a market price represents a price quoted in the distribution market for an asset. 
Value in use reflects the subjective value estimated by the reporting entity, and it 
consists of a market price and intangible (subjective) goodwill, which is defined as 
the excess of value in use over the market price23. In the present system subjective 
goodwill is excluded from financial reporting, and this exclusion is supported by 
many researchers24. However, it is necessary to examine the "common sense" that 
subjective goodwill should not be recognized. Arguments outlining what the 
exclusion of subjective goodwill means, and to what extent it should be eliminated 
from accounting earnings and the financial reporting system are not entirely verified. 
With regards to income measurement and subjective goodwill, there have been 
many studies, including Edwards and Bell (1961) (referred to from now on as E&B) 
Lee (1975) and Solomon (1961). E&B define subjective goodwill Gt as the 
difference of the subjective value (value in use) of the asset Vt, and market price of 
the asset Pt. Vt is the present value of future cash flow Ci earned between time t+1 
and time n at time t, expressed as follows. 
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23 Ibid., Chap.4, paras.11,20,21 
24 Yang (1927), Coughman (1924), Alexander (1977), etc. 
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In E&B, subjective profit (economic income) Yt is defined as the amount that 
could be paid out as dividends in any period without impairing subjective value at 
the beginning of a period. It is expressed in this equation (3). 
 
 
1)( −−+= tttt VVCY
)( 1 ttt VVC −−= − 
(3) 1−= trV 
Similarly, realisable profit It is defined as the size of the dividend a firm could 
plan to pay at the end of a period without impairing the market value of its assets. It 
is expressed in this equation (4). 
 
 1
)( −−+= tttt PPCI
(4) )( 1 ttt PPC −−= − 
The difference between subjective profit and realisable profit is equivalent to 
the amount of the change or conversion of subjective goodwill. This is explained 
only by numerical examples in E&B as well. The following equations (5) show this 
relation; the coincidence of the difference of subjective profit and realisable profit 
and the conversion amount of subjective goodwill is obvious as long as they are 
defined in this way. This means that this relation is a necessary conclusion, not a 
unique implication, under these definitions. 
 { })()( 11 tttttttt VVCPPCYI −−−−−=− −−
 
)()( 11 tttt PVPV −−−= −− 
tt GG −= −1 
(5) )( 1 tttt GGYI −+= − 
In E&B, although the conversion process of subjective goodwill is clarified by 
comparing subjective profit with realisable profit, the process drawn from the 
relation between subjective profit and accounting income is not necessarily clarified. 
This paper examines the latter and clarifies the conversion process of subjective 
goodwill in accounting income, specified by the concept of released from risks. As 
mentioned previously, since the concept of income, based on the concept of released 
from risks in ASBJ (2006), is not significantly different from income in 
conventional accounting, this paper considers that both are theoretically similar.  
Accounting income Et is defined as follows, following E&B, where BB
C −= −
t is book 
value at time t. The equation (6) shows that Ct is divided into accounting income Et 
and accounting depletion . )( 1 tt BB −−
 
        E−
)( 1 tttt BBCE −−= −
(6) )( 1 tttt BB
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First, the simple case of t=1, B1=P1 is examined. Since this is a case where 
book value at  time 1 corresponds with a market price, accounting income E1 is 
equivalent to realisable profit I1 (because of BB1=P1, B0B =P0). Realisable profit I1 is 
transformed as follows using equation (5). These equation show that the total 
amount of conversion of subjective goodwill (G0 – G1) is included in accounting 
income E1, since { })( 101 GGY −+  is equivalent to realisable profit I1 as well as 
accounting income E1; so is included in accounting income E)( 10 GG − 1 , as equation 
(7). In the case that a dividend is equivalent to accounting income E1, 
, that is carried out to financial investment which brings about the 
rate of target interest, is maintained as capital..  
)( 1010 PPBB −=−
 
)( 1011 PPCI −−= 
(7) { } )()( 101011 PPGGY C =−+− −
Secondly, the case of t=1, BB1≠P1 is examined. In this case the relation 
between accounting income I1, realisable profit E1, and subjective profit Y1 is 
expressed in this way, . Using this equation 
with the definition of realisable profit I
)()()( 111011111 BPGGYBPIE −−−+=−−=
1, equation (5), transformed equations are 
expressed as the following, equation (8). This shows that the total amount of 
conversion of subjective goodwill (G0 – G1) is not necessarily included in 
accounting income E1, but (G0 – G1) – (P1 – B1B ) is included. In this case when a 
dividend is equivalent to accounting income E1, is maintained as capital.  10 BB −
 )( 1011 PPCI −−=
 { } )()( 101011 PPGGYC −=−+−
 
(8) 
 
{ }[ ] )()()()( 1011111011 PPBPBPGGYC −+−=−−−+−
In the case of BB1 < P1, since (P1 – B1B ) > 0, the conversion amount of subjective 
goodwill (G0 –G1) less (P1 – BB1) is included in accounting income E1 in the current 
period. This means that (P1 – B1B ) of accounting income is not recognised in the 
current period, but will be recognised in the future instead. That is, a part of current 
income is deferred. On the other hand, in the case of BB1 > P1, since (P1 – B1B ) < 0, the 
conversion amount of subjective goodwill (G0 –G1) plus (P1 – BB1) is included in 
accounting income E1 in the current period. This means that (P1 – B1B ) of accounting 
income will not be recognised in future, but is recognised in the current period 
instead. That is, a part of future income is advanced.  
Finally, the general case at time t is examined. In this case, the relation between 
accounting income I1, realisable profit E1, and subjective profit Y1 is expressed in 
this way, { })()( 11 tttttt PPBBIE −−−−= −− { })()()( 111 ttttttt PPBBGGY −−−−−+= −−− . 
Using this equation with the definition of realisable profit I1, equation (5), 
transformed equations are expressed as the following equation (9). This shows that 
the total conversion amount of subjective goodwill (Gt-1 – Gt) is not necessarily 
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included in accounting income E1 in the current period as in the previous case. The 
amount of (Gt-1 – Gt) – {(BBt-1 – BtB ) – (Pt-1 – Pt)} is included in it. In this case, when a 
dividend is equivalent to accounting income Et , )( 1 tt BB −−  is maintained as capital. 
 )( 1 tttt PPCI −−= −
 { } )()( 11 tttttt PPGGYC −=−+− −−
 
 
{ }[ ] )()()()()()( 111111 tttttttttttttt PPPPBBPPBBGGYC −+−−−=−−−−−+− −−−−−− (9)
This conclusion also could be confirmed from the context of residual income, 
which is defined as the difference of accounting income and the multiplied book 
value at the beginning of the period by the discount rate. E&B point out that the 
present value of residual income based on realisable profit, which is defined as the 
difference of realisable profit and the multiplied market price at the beginning of the 
period by the discount rate, is equivalent to the subjective goodwill at time 0. They 
also mention that the present value of an anticipated stream of excess realisable 
profits equals subjective goodwill, and any one pattern of expected market values 
may yield the same subjective goodwill25.  
However, the coincidence of present value of residual income based on 
accounting income and subjective goodwill at time 0 is not necessarily examined in 
E&B, which is verified as follows.  
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The third and fourth terms are transformed as follows. 
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25 Edwards and Bell (1961), p.69 
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On the other hand, the present value of residual income based on accounting 
income is not equivalent to the subjective goodwill at time t; the coincidence only 
exists at time 0. This means that the total amount of subjective goodwill conversion 
is not entirely included in accounting income. By contrast, the present value of 
residual income based on realisable profit equals subjective goodwill at time t, not 
only at time 0. 
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This means that the present system of financial reporting (income 
measurement) is not an obvious mechanism in which the total amount of converted 
subjective goodwill is included in current accounting income. Since subjective profit 
is not included in the firm’s income but included in stockholders’ income at time 0, 
subjective goodwill is excluded from the accounting income of the firm. However, a 
part of non-converted subjective goodwill is included in accounting income in the 
subsequent year. That is, in the present system the structure of income measurement 
does not exclude the non-converted subjective goodwill entirely but rather, it is 
assumed.  
As long as the depreciation cost that corresponds to annual cash flow is 
calculated by a systematic depreciation method, this is an inevitable result. If one 
needs to recognise the total amount of converted subjective goodwill (to exclude the 
non-converted amount from current income, and not to defer the converted amount 
to future income), it is necessary to calculate depreciation cost by the change in 
market price in each period. It is obvious that depreciation based on market price 
change is necessary in order to exclude the non-converted subjective goodwill from 
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accounting income, as long as subjective goodwill is defined as Vt－Pt. However, it 
is not necessarily clear to what extent the converted amount of subjective goodwill 
is included in accounting income on the basis of a systematic depreciation.  This 
paper distinguishes the amount of converted and non-converted subjective goodwill 
included in current income, and thus verifies the income measurement mechanism 
from the context of the allocation problem of subjective goodwill. 
What are the implications for a theory of earnings quality that clarifies the 
income measurement structure? Supposing managerial discretion may increase the 
usefulness of accounting income information, how is it considered in the allocation 
problem of subjective goodwill? The argument that the non-converted portion of 
subjective goodwill is not completely excluded from accounting income in each year 
means that it is possible for managerial discretion to be included in the measurement 
structure of accounting income. As clarified by the analysis above, the portion which 
is not reflected in current accounting income within the converted amount of 
subjective goodwill is expressed with (BBt-1 – BtB ) – (Pt-1 – Pt). This amount is 
considered to be an error in the allocation of subjective goodwill, and to be the 
portion in which managerial discretion is reflected. Supposing managerial discretion 
in measurement operation serves as a means to transmit private information that 
managers themselves hold, and that the usefulness of accounting income is increased 
by such information, it is also possible that a certain additional informational content 
about the future is included in the portion, (BBt-1 – BtB )  – (Pt-1 – Pt).  This means there 
is a possibility that information contents are included in the allocation error itself in 
which managerial discretion or judgment is included.  
As mentioned above, the facts on investment results are thought to be an 
important element in accounting income based on the concept of released from 
(business) risks. However, although there are restrictions that it be accepted only 
below the acquisition cost, managerial subjective judgments are included in the cost 
allocation method and also in the matching concept of income measurement. 
Examining the allocation problem of subjective goodwill entails the exploration of 
the meaning of the matching concept as well.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
An argument on quality of earnings is related to the basic concept in financial 
reporting, and is also closely related to the disclosure system in a capital market. 
However, despite its importance, there is still no commonly accepted agreement in 
the definition or measurement of quality of earnings. The various classification 
methods are intermingled and lack a common perspective on the influence that 
various characteristics have on the quality of earnings. Since theories of earnings 
quality often are discussed within the context of value relevance, in this paper, 
17 
particular attention is paid to the allocation problem in accruals. Thus, quality of net 
income, specified using the concept of released from business risks, is examined 
from the viewpoint of the allocation problem of subjective goodwill. This paper 
clarifies the amount of the allocation error included in accounting income by 
generalizing the conversion process of subjective goodwill. It is posited that this is a 
portion of managerial discretion in income measurement, and includes certain 
informational content that increases the usefulness of accounting income. 
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